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DIVORCE: STANDING TO "DIRECTLY"
ATTACK SISTER-STATE DECREE DOES
NOT DEPEND UPON DOMICILE IN THE
FORUM AT DATE OF THAT DECREE
In Meeker v. Meeker' the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
a Mexican ex parte divorce may be attacked by a New Jersey
domiciliary in a New Jersey proceeding instituted solely for that
purpose despite the fact that as of the date of the divorce decree
neither spouse had ever been a domiciliary of New Jersey. After six
years of marriage the Meekers separated, Mrs. Meeker becoming
domiciled in England and Mr. Meeker in the Phillipine Islands. In
1958 Mr. Meeker obtained an ex parte divorce in Mexico. Mrs.
Meeker thereafter established permanent residence in New Jersey
and brought suit to have the Mexican divorce declared null and
void. The trial court dismissed on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed, purporting to overturn the venerable New Jersey
precedent, apparently common to other states which have
considered the issue,2 that standing to "directly" attack a sister-
state divorce depends upon the attacker's having been domiciled in
the attack forum as of the date of the divorce.'
Domicile has traditionally been held a constitutional
prerequisite to the granting of a divorce.4 Even an ex parte decree is
entitled to full faith and credit5 as to the issue of status if obtained
by a party domiciled in the issuing state.' On the other hand, a
court lacks jurisdictional power-to adjudicate the marital status of
parties both of whom voluntarily appear and consent to jurisdiction
152 N.J. 59, 243 A.2d 801 (1968).
2 California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New York and Wisconsin.
I It seems probable that this rule is a reflection of early theories of divorce jurisdiction. See
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
' Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964); Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat.
122.
1 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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if neither of the parties is domiciled in the forum-state.7
Furthermore, the test of domicile which must be satisfied is not one
merely prescribed by the forum-state, but rather one which must
conform to a minimum constitutional standard.' An ex parte
proceeding based on domicile is only entitled to full faith and credit
as to status, however, and cannot finally determine the financial
responsibilities of the parties since a property adjudication in the
absence of personal jurisdiction would be a denial of due process.'
Moreover, an ex parte decree based upon domicile of one of the
parties may always be attacked collaterally in another state by the
absent party on the jurisdictional ground that the party obtaining
the decree was not in fact domiciled in the issuing state."0 Subject
to these avenues of attack, however, domicile of the petitioning
party in the forum-state is a totally sufficient jurisdictional basis
for a decree of divorce.
Present domicile alone, however, has not been considered an
adequate jurisdictional basis for parties wishing to attack a sister-
state divorce decree. Indeed, most states have refused, except under
limited circumstances," to permit such an attack unless the
attacker was domiciled in the attack-forum state at the time the
divorce decree was rendered. 2 In New Jersey, an ex parte divorce
defendant was deprived of standing to attack the decree unless the
attack was truly "collateral" 3-arising in a proceeding which sought
' Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1953).
8Id.
I New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151
(1884); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
to Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"E.g., De Young v. De Young, 159 P.2d 102 (Cal. App. 1945), affd on other grounds, 27
Cal. 2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 (1946) (husband prevented his wife from obtaining knowledge of
his divorce action); Santangelo v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 404, 78 A.2d 245, cert. denied, 341
U.S. 927 (1951) (husband prevented his alien wife from gaining entry into the United States
until after he had obtained his divorce).
"See, e.g., Curley v. Curley, 120 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 614 (1941);
Morrissey v. Morrissey, I N.J. 448, 64 A.2d 209 (1949); Floyd v. Floyd, 95 N.J. Eq. 661,
124 A. 525 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924); Bell v. Cross, 231 N.Y. 329, 132 N.E. 106 (1921);
Denkman v. Denkman, 172 Misc. 57, 14 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Standish v.
Standish, 179 Misc. 564, 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Dom. Rd. Ct. 1943). But see, e.g., De Young v.
De Young, 159 P.2d 102 (Cal. App. 1945), affd on other grounds, 27 Cal. 2d 521, 165 P.2d
457 (1946); cf. Santangelo v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 404, 78 A.2d 245, cert. denied. 341 U.S.
927 (1951); In re Gibson's Estate, 7 Wis. 2d 506, 96 N.W.2d 859 (1959).
"1 Morrissey v. Morrissey, I N.J. 448, 64 A.2d 209 (1949); Floyd v. Floyd, 95 N.J. Eq.
661, 124 A. 525 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 13 N.J. Misc. 788, 180 A. 434
(Ch. 1935); Fried v. Fried, 99 N.J. Eq. 106, 132 A. 674 (Ch. 1926).
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relief such as alimony or separate maintenance and which
necessitated the incidental nullification of the prior divorce in order
to be successful."4 A "direct" attack-one seeking nullification of
the prior divorce by the New Jersey courts as its sole relieF"-was
prohibited.'6 The exclusion of "direct" attacks was based upon a
belief that if the attacker was not domiciled in New Jersey when
the sister-state divorce was rendered, there was no "marital res"
within New Jersey nor fraud upon the New Jersey courts which
would provide a basis for jurisdiction over a suit attacking the
sister-state decree. 7 It was further feared that in the absence of
such a rule New Jersey would become a "mecca for disgruntled
divorcees."' 8 The Meeker court, by adopting a choice-of-law rule
requiring imposition of the law of the state in which the attacker
was domiciled as of the date of the divorce, dispelled the fear that
its holding would turn New Jersey into such a "mecca." This
choice of law limitation removes any incentive to forum shop based
on the defendant's desire to avail himself of whatever comparative
advantages New Jersey's law might provide him as opposed to the
law of his previous domicile.' 9 Relying on the supposition that
domicile in fact of either spouse offers a sufficient jurisdictional
basis to grant a divorce,"0 the New Jersey court concluded that
present domicile in New Jersey was an adequate jurisdictional base
for a suit attacking a foreign decree of divorce."' The court further
reasoned that if the divorce was a fraud upon a genuine New Jersey
domiciliary, then the courts of New Jersey had a sufficient interest
in her marital status to justify intervention."
The significance of the Meeker decision would seem to lie in its
conclusion that a state has a sufficient basis to exercise jurisdiction
over a suit attacking an ex parte sister-state divorce if the attacker
is domiciled in the attack-forum state at the time the attack is
brought. Except for a few cases, distinguishable because of their
" Morrissey v. Morrissey, I N.J. 448, 64 A.2d 209, 210-11 (1949): F. JAMES. CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 11.5 (1965).
"See I N.J. at 452, 64 A.2d at 210-11; JAMES, supra note 14, at § I 1.5.6 See cases cited note 13 supra.
"See Floyd v. Floyd, 95 N.J. Eq. 661, 664, 124 A. 525, 526 (1923).
"See id. at 665. 124 A. at 527.
"See 59 N.J. at _ 243 A.2d at 806.
:See id. at - 243 A.2d at 805.
: Se id. at 243 A.2d at 805-06.
: See id. at - 243 A.2d at 806.
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bizarre factual situations, 3 Meeker is the first case to so hold. The
Supreme Court has apparently never dealt with the question of
whether the domicile of an individual is relevant to his standing to
attack an ex parte divorce. There is little difficulty in justifying a
finding of jurisdiction in the Meeker case, however, since if present
domicile of one of the parties is a sufficient jurisdictional basis for
a decree of divorce it should be equally sufficient for an action to
establish the continued validity of a marriage. Moreover, since the
plaintiff had become a genuine domiciliary of New Jersey, and
since the state in which she had been domiciled on the date of the
divorce no longer had a substantial interest in the marital
relationship, arguably New Jersey stood as the state most
concerned with the plaintiff's marital status." This seems to be the
approach taken sub-silentio by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
emphasizing that every "Meeker" plaintiff will be subjected to
intense scrutiny concerning the genuineness of his New Jersey
domicile.2 The court's decision to apply the substantive law of the
state of the attacker's domicile as of the date of the divorce is
arguably justifiable because it recognizes that as of the date of the
divorce New Jersey had no interest in the marriage, albeit New
Jersey now has the superior interest. While New Jersey's present
superior interest might logically justify applying New Jersey law
regarding the validity of the ex parte decree, such a contention
must fail upon recognition of the grave danger of forum-shopping
which such a policy would create.
Apart from the Meeker court's determination that present
domicile constitutes a sufficient basis for jurisdiction lies the court's
apparent implication that domicile of the attacker in the attack-
forum state when the attack is brought is an absolute prerequisite
to jurisdiction over a suit attacking an ex parte divorce decree.
There is language in several cases which seemingly supports such a
position. 6 The requirement of domicile in the forum-state as a
prerequisite to divorce jurisdiction is based upon the strong and
unique interests which the state or states in which the spouses are
" See cases cited note II supra.
" See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
"' See 59 N.J. at _ 243 A.2d at 806.
'See. e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948); In re Chong Jah Alix, 252 F. Supp.
313, 314 (1965); Turpin v. Turpin, 175 So. 2d 357, 359 (La. App. 1965); Sharp v. Sharp,
416 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Mo. App. 1967).
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domiciled have in their marital status."' Protection of offspring,
property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities
are but a few of the commanding problems in the field of domestic
relations with which the state must deal.28 Inasmuch as these
interests are vitally affected whether the issue is severance of a
marital relationship or reinstatement of a previously severed
relationship, the reasons for requiring domicile as the basis for
jurisdiction in the former case are as compelling in the latter. It
cannot forcefully be contended that interests which are of such
great import to a particular state should be left to the mercy of
wholly disinterested jurisdictions. Nor can the fact that a suit
attacks rather than seeks a divorce be enough to justify a different
standard. As the court in Meeker properly realized, however, it
does not seem logical or necessary to extend the general
requirement of domicile to the point of requiring such domicile as
of the date of the divorce as a prerequisite to jurisdiction over a
suit attacking an ex parte divorce. Whatever interests which the
state of prior domicile or its citizens may have can be adequately
protected by applying the law of that state in any attack suit.
Viewed in this light; Meeker satisfactorily balances the interests of
the attacker's domicile as of the date of the divorce with the
interests of his present domicile. It further permits individuals the
maximum freedom to alter their marital relationships consistent
with the legitimate interests of the various states and parties involv-
ed in the controversy.
" See note 24 supra.
22 Id.
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